The emergence of delinquency in multicultural societies is often the product of a collision between indigenous values and formal laws. The present study, drawing on Thorsten Sellin’s cultural conflict theory, seeks to explain how crime is formed at the intersection of legal norms and behavioral norms. The main objective of this article is to identify the roots of delinquency in regions of Iran that still remain under the dominance of tribal traditions and customary norms. This research has been developed through a descriptive-analytical approach and based on library sources. In this process, by using a qualitative analysis method, concrete instances of normative conflict in Iranian criminal law have been examined, and the gap between the legislator’s intent and cultural realities has been extracted. The analyses indicate that concepts such as honor killings, the tradition of khoon-bas, and celebratory gunfire are clear examples of primary and secondary conflict within Iran’s legal system. The findings show that, in such cases, the offender becomes trapped between obedience to the law and loyalty to group identity, and, because of the greater force of social sanctions, prefers behavioral norms over legal norms. Iran’s criminal policy, in order to control such crimes, requires a shift from a monophonic approach toward a disciplined legal pluralism. The results of the study suggest that, by recognizing the institution of cultural defense and involving customary structures in the process of restorative justice, the human costs of cultural conflicts can be reduced. Law will be deterrent only when, instead of suppressing cultural differences, it absorbs and manages them within itself.