نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
عنوان مقاله English
نویسندگان English
Abstract
Upon accepting the basic principle of the legitimacy of filtering as one of the instruments of governance within the framework of governmental rulings (*ahkam hokoomati*), the fundamental and often overlooked question arises: what are the permissible scope and examples of exercising this sovereign right? This study, adopting an analytical-descriptive method and grounded in Imami jurisprudence, seeks to move beyond the general proof of legitimacy and instead determine the criteria and precisely outline the specific categories of content subject to filtering based on Islamic legal principles.
To achieve this, principles such as Nafy al-Sabil (denial of dominance by non-believers), prohibition of preserving misleading writings, public interest, no harm principle (la darar), and the principle of prioritization between more and less important matters (aham wa mohem) are analyzed not merely as proofs of legitimacy but as measuring frameworks for identifying prohibited content.
Findings indicate that each principle covers a defined spectrum of content—from national and military security threats (Nafy al-Sabil) to systematic promotion of atheism and moral corruption (misleading writings)—and, conversely, delineates boundaries of exclusion (such as non-destructive criticism or neutral scientific information). In contrast, the principle of prohibition against violating privacy, itself firmly rooted in strong religious evidences, emerges as the most significant limitation on the exercise of filtering authority.
Ultimately, the study presents a hierarchical and multi-criteria model that, by integrating jurisprudential principles with the right to privacy, identifies cases where filtering is absolutely necessary, where alternative minimal interventions (such as age rating or content labeling) suffice, and where governmental interference is not permitted at all. This model underscores the necessity of enacting clear, objective, and supervisable legislation as the only practical path toward achieving this jurisprudential–legal balance.
کلیدواژهها English